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T he Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA")', was enacted in 19802
and revised by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 ("SARA").3 CERCLA was enacted in response to the
public's perception of danger following the discovery of toxic
waste buried beneath the residential community of Love Canal,
New York.4 One of the purposes of Superfund is to finance haz-
ardous waste cleanup costs attributable to insolvent or unidentified
parties.5 While some commentators have criticized CERCLA as
being poorly drafted and ineffectively implemented,6 others support
the law and advocate only modest changes. Almost everyone in-
volved in the CERCLA debate, however, believes that CERCLA
should be altered to effect a more efficient administration of haz-
ardous waste cleanups.7
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94.Stat. 2767 (1980).
3. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986).
4. Stephen Crable, ADR: A Solution for Environmental Disputes, 48 ARB. J.
24, 26 (1993).
5. Id.; see John H. Cushman, Jr., G.O.P. to Start From Scratch in Revising
Toxic Dump Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.- 31, 1995, at A19. These costs are often re-
ferred to as "orphan shares." See Gould v. A & M Battery and Tire Serv., 901 F.
Supp. 906, 908 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
6. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S14,736 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Dole); Cushman, supra note 6, at A19.
7. See Al Meyerhoff, The Fine Print on the Contract With America, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1995, at B7; see also Cushman, supra note 4, at A19.
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During the 103d Congressional term, legislators introduced a
compromise bill designed to reauthorize CERCLA.' Environmen-
talists, the Clinton Administration, congressional committees, pol-
luters and the entire insurance industry cooperated in an effort to
pass much needed CERCLA reauthorization and financing.9 De-
spite the best efforts of the bill's supporters, partisan politics pre-
vailed and prevented passage of the bill.' °
The political climate has since changed. The elections of Novem-
ber, 1994, brought a Republican majority to both the House of
Representatives and the Senate." The 104th Congress does not
share some of the basic assumptions of its predecessors regarding
CERCLA. In fact, many of the newly elected members of Congress
favor repealing CERCLA altogether and devising an entirely new
approach to the cleanup of potentially harmful toxic wastes. 2 Sen-
ator Robert Dole (Republican-Kansas), the Senate Majority Leader,
for instance, views CERCLA as a "bad law, in both the way it has
been structured and implemented."' 3 The Republican lawmakers
who will exert the most influence on CERCLA by virtue of the
committees they chair, Senators Robert C. Smith of New Hamp-
shire and Representative Michael G. Oxley of Ohio, have signaled
that they will disregard any previously agreed upon compromises
and start anew when they review the law.' 4 According to Erik
Olson, an attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council, the
overwhelming defeat of incumbent Democrats in 1994 did not stem
from the public's view of environmental concerns."
8. S. 1834, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994); H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1994).
9. Ellin Rosenthal, Natural Resources 1994 In Review and the Year Ahead, 8
NAT. RESOURCES TAx REv. 9 (1995).
10. Id.
11. See An Overview of Possible Impacts of 1994 Elections on Environmental
Issues, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1392 (Nov. 18, 1994).
12. See Meyerhoff, supra note 8, at B7.
13. 140 CONG. REC. S14,736 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
14. Cushman, supra note 6, at A19.
15. See An Overview of Possible Impacts of 1994 Elections on Environmental
Issues, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1392 (Nov. 18, 1994).
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Rather, dissatisfaction with Democrats and the appeal of the up-
start Republicans appeared to be based upon widespread public
dissatisfaction over tax policy. 6 Senator Smith and Representative
Oxley have expressed that existing taxes are adequate fund the
cleanup of most toxic waste sites if the states and other parties
acted more efficiently and if cleanup standards were more flexi-
ble. 7 In keeping with the Republican party's "Contract With
America,"'" Senator Smith and Representative Oxley have stated
that any changes to CERCLA will not include new taxes. 9
This Note discusses some of the numerous tax issues involved
with CERCLA reauthorization. Part I explains the current structure
of CERCLA. Part II discusses some of the primary difficulties with
the current statutory scheme. Part III describes a solution involving
new taxes proposed by the Clinton administration. Finally, Part IV
proposes the author's own solution for reforming financing for the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites by extending the current CERCLA
taxes without imposing new taxes and encouraging the use of alter-
native dispute resolution.
I. THE CURRENT FUNDING STRUCTURE OF CERCLA AND ITS
EFFECTIVENESS
Under the present law, which includes CERCLA, SARA and later
extensions of the law by Congress,2" the proceeds from four sepa-
rate taxes provide the funding for toxic waste cleanups.2' First,
there is a 14.7 cents per barrel excise tax on domestic and exported
crude oil or refined products.22 A second provision of the Internal
Revenue Code provides for an excise tax on certain hazardous
16. See An Overview of Possible Impacts of 1994 Elections on Environmental
Issues, supra note 12, at 1392.
17. Cushman, supra note 6, at A19.
18. "Contract With America" refers to the Republican party's legislative agen-
da for the 104th Congress as popularized by Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives, Newt Gingrich.
19. Cushman, supra note 6, at A19.
20. The 101st Congress extended the appropriations authorization for three
years through February 1994 and the taxes for four years through December 31,
1995. Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 6301, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
21. See I.R.C. §§ 59A, 4611, 4661, 4671 (1995).
22. I.R.C. § 4611 (1995).
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chemicals ranging from $.22 to $4.87 per ton. 3 A third excise tax
is imposed on imported substances, the manufacturing or production
process of which contain one or more of the hazardous chemicals
subject to tax for export under I.R.C. § 4661.24 The final CERCLA
tax is a corporate environmental income tax equal to .12% of the
amount of modified alternative minimum taxable income in excess
of $2,000,000.' In other words, corporations must pay $12 in tax-
es for every $10,000 of alternative minimum taxable income. The
first $2 million of a corporation's annual income is exempt from
this tax.26 This corporate environmental tax is imposed even if a
corporation is not required to pay the alternative minimum tax .2
Justification for these four taxes is that because industry was the
primary beneficiary of the processes which created the hazardous
substances that require cleanup, they should assist in funding the
cleanups.28 Legislation to extend these taxes beyond their expira-
tion date of December 31, 1995, passed the House of Representa-
tives of the 103d Congress but stalled in the Senate.29
Under CERCLA, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
maintains a list of sites requiring cleanup known as the National
Priority List ("NPL").3 ° The bulk of cleanup costs for these sites
are borne by "potentially responsible parties" ("PRPs"),31 as identi-
fied by the EPA.32 PRPs are held jointly and severally liable, as
well as strictly liable, for cleanup costs of an NPL site irrespective
of the relative volume of wastes they contributed.33 In addition,
23. Id. § 4661.
24. Id. § 4671.
25. Id. § 59A.
26. [1996] 1 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) [ 5451.01; I.R.C. § 59A (1995).
27. [1996] 1 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 915451.01.
28. Crable, supra note 5, at 27.
29. Ways-Means Leaders Say Retroactive Liability Under CERCLA Must Be
Repealed, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 365 (Feb. 20, 1995).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1994).
31. CERCLA defines PRP to include owners and operators of vessels or facil-
ities, those who owned or operated the vessel or facilities at the time of the waste
disposal, and transporters of and those who arranged for the transport of hazard-
ous wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
32. CERCLA conveys this authority to the President. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)
(1994). This power, however, has been delegated to the EPA. ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 292 (1992).
33. Although CERCLA does not expressly impose joint and several liability,
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liability is retroactive, meaning that a PRP may be liable even
though the waste was disposed of before CERCLA was enacted.34
When the EPA cannot identify a PRP with sufficient assets,
Superfund bears the cost.35 Thus, CERCLA's civil liability scheme
seeks to ensure that funding exists to clean up existing NPL sites,
as well as to deter future environmental damage.
When CERCLA was enacted in 1980, $1.6 billion was provided
to fund the first five years of the program's operation. 6 In 1986,
funding was increased to $8.5 billion to cover the next five years of
cleanup. In order to provide adequate funding for the program
the rates of the four CERCLA taxes have been adjusted. CERCLA
authorizes the EPA, in its efforts to clean up hazardous wastes, to
pursue two alternative cleanup payment procedures. First, the EPA
itself may pay for the cleanup from the Superfund and then attempt
to recover the costs from the PRPs.38 Second, the EPA may
require PRPs to accomplish the cleanup without financial contribu-
tion or outlay from the Superfund.3 9
II. CRrICISM OF CERCLA
In August of 1994, the EPA reported that only 240 of the more
than 1,300 NPL sites had been successfully remediated.' The cur-
rent pace of cleanup is much too slow for congressional leaders
who are determined to root out the problems that are delaying the
cleanup process.4 One problem with the current system is that
much of the money available for remediation is being squandered
such liability has been found in cases in which the defendants can demonstrate
that the harm is divisible. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
34. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 173.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1994).
36. Id. at 27.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a).
38. Id. §§ 9604, 9607.
39. Id. § 9606.
40. 140 CONG. REc. S 12,604-605 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
41. Id. at S12,605.
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on transaction costs.42 In other words, too much of the money is
going to lawyers and not enough to the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites.43 Two reasons for this inefficiency are the haggling among
PRPs as to what share of the cleanup costs are attributable to which
parties and the difficulty in locating additional PRPs to help defray
the cleanup costs." In addition, litigation between PRPs and their
insurers over the extent of insurance coverage for CERCLA cleanup
costs adds substantially to the cost and delays associated with
cleanup.4"
Many other shortcomings of CERCLA have been noted by its
critics. These include the inefficiency of the cleanup process,' the
high costs with little corresponding benefit,47 and the harassment
of small businesses and municipalities by large corporate polluters
in an attempt to spread the costs of cleanup to others.' Economic
development has been stifled as a result of money lenders and pro-
spective property purchasers being discouraged by the potential
CERCLA liability. 49 CERCLA's retroactive liability holds PRPs
liable for actions that, when they were performed, may have been
entirely lawful." Because they fear CERCLA liability, potential
investors may be scared to invest in the cleanup and redevelopment
of NPL sites.5 Finally, cleanup standards bear no relation to the
expected future use of the NPL site. 2
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Sandy Shore, Environmental Detectives Track Down Polluters
Superfund, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1995, at B5.
45. Mark Reisch, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF,
SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES IN THE 103RD CONGRESS 2 (Oct. 5, 1994),
at 2.




50. Ways-Means Leaders Say Retroactive Liability Under CERCLA Must Be
Repealed, supra note 30, at 365.
51. 140 CONG. REC. at S12,605.
52. Keith Schneider, New View Calls Environmental Policy Misguided, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 21, 1993, at 1, 30.
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III. THE CLINTON APPROACH: THE ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE
RESOLUTION FUND
In anticipation of the expiration of CERCLA taxes in 1995, the
Clinton Administration proposed two tax-related plans.53 The first
proposal called for the fairly non-controversial extension of the
present CERCLA taxes through the year 2000."4 The proposal al-
located $1.6 billion for CERCLA in 1996, an increase of $131.7
million from the 1995 level.55 The second Clinton Administration
proposal was designed to address the issue of the abundance of liti-
gation surrounding insurance coverage of environmental cleanups.
The Administration proposed the imposition of two new insurance-
related taxes relating to commercial insurance and reinsurance poli-
cies. 6 These new taxes called for by the provision are intended to
finance a new Environmental Insurance Resolution Fund
("EIRF").57
A. Why is the EIRF necessary?
Insurance coverage for CERCLA claims has become one of the
most heavily litigated areas of the law. 8 One study estimates that
42% of the money spent by insurance companies in connection
with CERCLA "was spent on litigation related to contesting cover-
age claims by insureds."59 The insurance industry, if required to
compensate the insured's claims, would significantly deplete its
53. The entire Clinton Administration proposal may be found in H.R. 3800,
the "Superfund Reform Act of 1994," 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994).
54. S. 1834, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 903 (1994).
55. Hearings on the President's Budget Request for 1996 Before the Senate
Environment and Public Works Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement
of Carol M. Browner, Administrator U.S. Environmental Protection Agency),
available in, WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY Database, 1995 WL 60951, at *2.
56. S. 1834 § 903.
57. Id.
58. Theodore C. Taub, Pre-Transaction and Transactional Issues Involving
Hazardous MaterialsWaste, in LAND USE INSTITUTE: PLANNING, REGULATION,
LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION, at 251, 278 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study Materials, No. C851, 1993).
59. Id. (citing LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL., PRIVATE SECTOR CLEANUP EXPENDI-
TURES AND TRANSACTION COSTS AT 18 SUPERFUND SITES (Rand Institute for
Civil Justice ed., 1993)).
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capital reserves in a manner that would threaten the viability of the
industry. Potentially, the insurance industry would have to pay as
much as $30 to $50 billion over 30 years.' The total capital re-
serves of the affected insurance companies are estimated to be only
$70 -billion." There are hundreds of suits pending across the coun-
try by insureds seeking reimbursement for CERCLA-related expen-
ditures." One of the goals of the Clinton proposal is to eliminate
the need for this morass of litigation over insurance coverage relat-
ed to the cleanup of Superfund sites.63
In simplified form, the insurance litigation is based on differences
in the interpretation of Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL")
insurance policies. Until the late 1980's, when most insurers revised
the wording of CGL policies, the standard form provided in perti-
nent part:
The company wil pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of... property damage to which this insur-
ance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have
the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking
damages on account of such... property damage.
Insureds and their insurance companies disagreed as to the
meaning of the word "damages." Some courts, agreeing with the
insureds, have held that the term damages includes government
mandated cleanups that are not the result of litigation. 5 Other
courts, however, have held the opposite view, holding that the
term damages has a strict legal meaning and the cost of comply-
60. William T. Hassler, Insurance Aspects of Hazardous Waste Sites, in HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTES, SUPERFUND, AND ToxIc SUBSTANCES, at 205, 209 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study Materials, No. C948, 1994).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Barbara Kirchheimer, Administration Modifies Superfund Taxes to Satisfy
Reinsurers, 94 Tax Notes Today 182 (Sept. 15, 1994).
64. Taub, supra note 59, at 278-79.
65. Id. at 279 (citing AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal.
1990); McDonald Indus. Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am. 475 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa
1991); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 555 N.E.2d
576 (Mass. 1990)).
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ing with environmental statutes and regulations does not fall
within the word's scope.'
Another source of contention is over the meaning of the so-
called pollution exclusion clause that was a part of most CGL
policies between 1973 and 1986. The pollution exclusion clause
provided:
This insurance does not apply ... to ... property damage arising
out of the discharge of ... contaminants or pollutants into or upon
land... [T]his exclusion does not apply if such discharge... is
sudden and accidental. 67
The "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion
is another source of contention between insurers and insureds.
Some courts have agreed with the insured corporations' interpre-
tation that an occurrence that is unintended and unexpected from
the perspective of the insured is covered by the policy.68 Other
courts, however, have sided with the insurance companies, hold-
ing that coverage is excluded when the pollution occurred over an
extended period of time because in such instances the discharge
could not be considered sudden.69
Corporations acquire CGL policies to shield themselves from a
broad spectrum of potential liabilities. 7' Because these policies
provide generic coverage for a broad range of issues, the
66. Taub, supra note 59, at 279 (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 821 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v.
Gulf Resources and Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958 (D. Idaho 1989)).
67. Id. at 280.
68. Id. at 280-81 (citing Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,
811 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1991); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 380
S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989); U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co.,
578 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 1991); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570
(Wis. 1990)).
69. Id. at 281 (citing A. Johnson and Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,
988 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1991); New York v. Amro Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 (2d
Cir. 1981); United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. George W. Whitesides
Co., 932 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir. 1981); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476
N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991)).
70. Crable, supra note 5, at 28.
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language contained therein is necessarily general and broad.7
Naturally, since insurance carriers had not contemplated liability
to the extent of CERCLA claims, nor had they anticipated the
number of claims or even the existence of liability, CGL policies
have become a fertile battleground.72
B. The Environmental Insurance Resolution Fund
The EIRF was the Clinton Administration's proposed method
to end the proliferation of environmental insurance litigation
related to cleanup of Superfund sites, thereby reducing the trans-
action costs associated with prolonged litigation. The plan pro-
posed a fund, out of which insurance companies, through their
own contributions, would mitigate their own cost associated with
environmental insurance claims and thus lessen the amount of lit-
igation involved.73 The EIRF would be funded through new tax-
es on CGL policies or commercial multi-peril insurance for any
period prior to January 1, 1986."4 Forty-six percent of the fund-
ing would be generated by a tax on direct commercial liability in-
surance premiums: twenty-three percent by a tax on reinsurance
premiums, and thirty-one percent by a prospective tax on insur-
ance premiums for policies covering commercial lines of busi-
ness.75 In other words, sixty-nine percent of the revenues from
these taxes would be raised by a retroactive tax on the insurance
industry on polices written between 1971 and 1985, while thirty-
one percent of the revenues would be raised from an excise tax
on policies written during a five year prospective period com-
mencing with the enactment of the tax.76 According to Treasury
Department Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Leslie B. Samuels,
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See S. 1834, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 801-807 (1994).
74. Id. § 802(g)(2).
75. Kirchheimer, supra note 64, at 182.
76. JCT Describes Revenue Related Provisions of Superfund Bill, 7 NAT'L
RESOURCES TAX REv. 1885 (1994). Although this article states that the figures
are 70% and 30%, respectively, the totals used here are derived from the
Kirchheimer article, supra note 64, at 182.
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these figures were calculated with the intention of raising $810
million per year.77
The fund, once established, is designed to be used for partial
reimbursement directly to policyholders for the cost of environ-
mental cleanup instead of the more common method of reim-
bursement from insurers.78 In a mechanical manner, the EIRF
would determine a single percentage that would be applied to all
of a policyholder's eligible sites.79 The factors that would go
into determining the percentage of costs that a policyholder
would receive include the location of any suits filed by the poli-
cyholder and the location of each eligible site claimed by the
policyholder. 0 A reimbursement percentage of either twenty
percent, forty percent, or sixty percent would be statutorily as-
signed to each of the fifty states, depending on whether the par-
ticular state's law favors the insurer or the insured.8 The per-
centage assigned to a particular policyholder is permanent and
would apply to all of that policyholder's future sites. 2
The fund would endeavor to eliminate the insurance litigation
involved in hazardous waste cleanups. Once a policyholder ac-
cepts a payment from the EIRF, that policyholder's claims under
the applicable insurance policy would be extinguished.83 The
policyholder, instead of incurring huge litigation expenses, would
receive coverage for a percentage of the costs of remediation,
while remaining liable for the remaining costs out of its own
funds. The insurance company, in exchange for paying taxes to
77. Kirchheimer, supra note 64, at 182.
78. S. 1834, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 802(g)(5) (1994).
79. Id. § 802(g)(2)(B)-(g)(4).
80. Id. § 802(g)(4).
81. Id. § 802(g)(4)(B). States would be divided into three groups. Claimants
from Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, North Car-
olina, and Ohio would receive 20%; California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, New
Jersey, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin would receive 60%; and
claimants from all other states would receive 40%. Id. See also Rena I. Steinzor,
The Reauthorization of Superfund: Can the Deal of the Century be Saved?, 25
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10016 n.104 (1995).
82. S. 1834, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §802(g)(5)(1994).
83. Id. § 802(g)(5)(B).
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support the EIRF, would be released from all CERCLA liability
for all policyholders who accept a payment from the fund.
Although the Clinton proposal appeared to be a healthy com-
promise and a viable method to reduce, if not eliminate, the
abundance of insurance-related litigation resulting from CERCLA
liability, congressional approval of the EIRF was not forthcom-
ing. Despite landmark cooperation among a wide variety of op-
posing interest groups in drafting the bill, its shortcomings pre-
vented its passage. 4 Such shortcomings included the possibility
that large policyholders would refuse to avail themselves of the
fund because of a belief they would fare better in court."5 In
addition, although the larger insurance carriers generally support-
ed the bill, 6 many of the smaller members of the insurance in-
dustry did not." Lastly, and probably most decisively, Congress
was reluctant to enact new taxes. These factors, combined with
an unwillingness to reach a political compromise, led to the de-
feat of the Clinton Superfund Reauthorization proposal during the
103d Congress.
IV. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SUPERFUND
REAUTHORIZATION
The Environmental Protection Agency objectives in pursuing
Superfund Reauthorization include fairly assessing liability costs
and increasing efficiency in carrying out the actual cleanups.88
These objectives are not controversial. The only question is how
to achieve fairness and efficiency. Representative Michael B.
Oxley (Republican-Ohio), Chairman of the House Commerce
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials,
has stated that he and other Republican congressional leaders will
84. Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 9.
85. Nancy Rutter, Superstalled, CAL. LAW., July 1994, at 28, 30 (quoting
James Otto of Cummins & White, Los Angeles).
86. Hearings on House Ways and Means Superfund Revisions Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) (statement of
John P. Mascotte, Chairman of the American Insurance Association).
87. Lawmakers Starting to Address Superfund Reform Plans for 1995, 64
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 155 (Jan. 23, 1995).
88. John E. Osborn & Steven N. Williams, Reauthorizing Superfund: Prob-
lems and Prospects, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 29, 1994, at 4.
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push for comprehensive reform of CERCLA, rather than piece-
meal legislation.89 Included in their objectives are the reduction
of CERCLA-related litigation costs, more control over cleanups
and cleanup standards by local communities, different cleanup
standards for individual hazardous waste sites related to expected
future use, and the repeal of retroactive liability.' The Republi-
cans intend to accomplish all of these goals without expanding
the current taxes under CERCLA and without enacting any new
taxes.9 THe methodology for attaining these goals without en-
acting new taxes remains unclear. The goal of the following pro-
posal is to apply a variety of cost saving techniques that will
lower costs associated with cleanups, improve the current system,
and avoid raising taxes.
According to leaders of the 104th Congress,
"everything is on the table" regarding CERCLA reform.9 Cur-
rently, House and Senate committees and subcommittees are hear-
ing testimony and holding meetings in an effort to completely
overhaul CERCLA and reform the current system.93 According
to one congressional insider, every facet of CERCLA will be de-
bated.94
A. No New Taxes
Senator John Chafee (Republican-Rhode Island), Chairman of
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, has stated
that it is highly unlikely that new taxes would be enacted under
CERCLA Reauthorization.9" The consensus among the Republi-
can leadership is that only the existing CERCLA taxes will be
renewed and no new taxes will be considered.' In fact, Repre-
89. Lawmakers Starting to Address Superfund Reform Plans for 1995, supra
note 88, at 155.
90. Telephone Interview with Jeff Merryfield, Majority Counsel Senate
Subcomm. on Superfund Waste Control and Risk Assessment (Feb. 6, 1995).
91. Id.
92. Congressmen Say Everything is on the Table with Superfund, 64 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 266 (Feb. 6, 1995).
93. Telephone Interview with Jeff Merryfield, supra note 91.
94. Id.
95. Congressmen Say Everything is on the Table with Superfund, supra note
93, at 267.
96. Ways-Means Leaders Say Retroactive Liability Under CERCLA Must Be
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sentative Bill Archer (Republican-Texas), House Ways and
Means Committee Chairman, warned, "[d]on't come to me and
ask me for any increased taxes, because they are not coming out
of the Ways and Means Committee."97
In light of the Strong sentiment opposing the imposition of new
taxes, it is unlikely that the 104th Congress will consider, and
even less likely that they will pass, the Clinton EIRF proposal.
Rather, Congress will attempt to reach, at a minimum, the same
objectives provided for in the Clinton Administration proposal
without raising taxes. This goal presumably can be accomplished
by lowering costs associated with CERCLA, helping to curb or
even prevent the need for new taxes.
B. Alternative Dispute Resolution
One of the primary factors that has added to the cost and decel-
erated the pace of hazardous waste site cleanups is litigation
among insurers and insureds, as well as litigation among PRPs.9"
Issues of liability have slowed the progress of the entire system
and entangled it in a web of transaction costs." Increasingly,
parties have resorted to alternative dispute resolution methods
("ADR") to decrease costs and speed disposition of conflicts
throughout the legal system.01
Repealed, supra note 29, at 365.
97. Id.
98. ROGER STRELOW, CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES LEGAL PROGRAM, IN-
TRODUCTION TO CPR MODEL PROCEDURE, CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS: ADR
STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATIONS, LAW FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 433 (1988).
This study advocates a private procedure for settling Superfund issues developed
by the Center for Public Resources Hazardous Waste Committee, which consists
of leading experts in hazardous waste cleanup issues from the private bar and
major corporations. In 1993, CPR successfully resolved business disputes involv-
ing $1.7 billion through ADR. See also CATHY CRONIN-HARRIS, ADR COST
SAVINGS AND BENEFIT STUDIES, CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES MODEL ADR
PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES 1-30 (1994).
99. Id.
100. Barbara Hopkinson Kelly, Alternative Dispute Resolution of Environmen-
tal Insurance Coverage Claims, in ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE
CLAIMS AND LITIGATION 1994 511, 511-12 (PLI Comm. Law & Prac. Course
Handbook Series No. 691, 1994); see also Thomas P. Grumbly, Insufficient Use
of ADR is Obstacle to Achieving More Superfund Settlements, in ALTERNATIVE
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The use of alternatives to traditional litigation to resolve
CERCLA liability issues is not a novel approach. The use of
binding arbitration has been recommended by the National Com-
mission on Superfund."'0 SARA allows PRPs to settle issues of
proportional liability for de minimis parties in exchange for an
exemption from joint and several liability under CERCLA. °2
Also, under SARA, PRPs are given an opportunity, before the
EPA begins cleanup or remedial actions, to negotiate a cleanup
and financing proposal with the EPA."0 3 SARA establishes a
time frame within which the settlement must take place in order
to facilitate negotiations."°
As suggested by these other proposals and procedures, some
lawmakers believe that alternative methods of dispute resolution
can work. Why not attempt to make it work on a grander scale
and restructure the entire system? A hybrid approach including
negotiation, mediation, arbitration and summary trials, would
provide an efficient system in which to settle liability
disputes."°5 Presumably, ADR may be employed to resolve dis-
putes among the EPA and PRPs or between local governments
and PRPs in regard to cleanup standards as well. The alternative
system would also be available for use by PRPs to resolve contri-
bution claims. All of these issues, in fact, could be addressed in
one comprehensive proceeding, rather than separate litigation,
resulting in a further reduction of the overall costs involved in the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVES: A BNA SPECIAL REPORT
149, 152 (1990); CRONIN-HARRIS, supra note 99, at 1-36.
101. Osborn & Williams, supra note 89, at 4.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g),(h) (1994). See also Dravo Corp. v. Zuber, 804 F.
Supp. 1182 (D. Neb. 1992), affd, 13 F.3d 1222 (8th Cir. 1994). Many courts
have also exempted PRPs from joint and several liability where the defendant can
show that a reasonable basis for apportioning liability exists. See In re Bell Pe-
troleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Broderick
Inv. Co., 862.F.Supp. 272 (D. Colo. 1994).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 9622.
104. Id.
105. See STRELOW, supra note 99, at 438-39. In a Maryland case, the use of
ADR procedures in settling factual disputes over the identification, amount and
remediation cost of asbestos removal was estimated to have saved three years of
litigation. Crable, supra note 5, at 30.
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ADR methods have proven to be less costly and less time con-
suming than litigation." President Clinton's proposed EIRF
may reduce the transaction costs incurred as a result of prolonged
litigation over cleanup liability. °7 Presently, however, the
Clinton plan merely shifts much of the cost involved and requires
it to be paid in the form of a tax."0 8 In reality, under the Clinton
plan, PRPs who thought they could receive a better settlement in
court than that offered by the EIRF would likely continue to
engage in litigation, and hinder the EIRF from achieving its de-
sired effect. What is needed is a system that reduces transaction
costs stemming from protracted litigation. It is important to ex-
amine alternative options to the traditional adversarial system,' °9
An alternative system for settlement of all CERCLA-related
litigation issues would have several distinct advantages. First,
dispute resolution would result reduction of transaction costs,
including attorney's fees, expert witness fees and trial expens-
es." o An ADR system would first allocate liability among the
PRPs. Thus, at the very beginning of the process, each PRP
would know precisely its own share of the total cleanup costs.
Since all proportional liability will be determined initially, incen-
tive to litigate may be removed because the potential for joint and
several liability is greatly reduced."' Once each PRP knows its
proportionate share of the liability costs, all PRPs have the com-
mon objective of negotiating with the government and accom-
plishing cleanup."' This spirit of cooperation may enable PRPs
to share costs of counsel, expert witnesses, and consultants." 3
106. STRELOW, supra note 99, at 438-39.
107. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
109. Kelly, supra note 101, at 511.
110. Id. at 511-12.
111. STRELOW, supra note 99, at 435. Although joint and several liability is not
expressly mandated under CERCLA, courts have uniformly applied it to
Superfund cases. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1071 (1990); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa.
1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
112. STRELOW, supra note 99, at 436.
113. Id. At the Glenwood Landing, New York site alone, 257 PRPs hired more
than 130 law firms. Rudy Abramson, The Superfund Cleanup: Mired In Its Own
Mess, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1993, at Al.
,1996] INCENTIVES FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS
This arrangement can potentially reduce not only duplicate costs
and effort, but litigation costs as well if a trial does, in fact, fol-
low."4 In an April 1985 study of Superfund-related litigation
costs, the economic consulting firm of Putnam, Hayes and Bart-
lett indicated that two-thirds to three-fourths of Superfund litiga-
tion costs could be eliminated and cleanups would occur more
quickly if PRPs could share resources in the manner de-
scribed."5
The Center for Public Resources ("CPR") has compiled statis-
tics demonstrating the savings achieved through effective use of
ADR in non-environmental contexts. In 1993, with the help of
third-party neutrals provided by CPR, 150 companies estimated
direct savings in legal costs of $37.5 million."6 During the
three year period between 1990 and 1993, in disputes settled
through ADR and involving CPR assistance, parties have saved
$187 million of their estimated legal costs." 7 Similar savings
have been demonstrated by other studies."' One such study in-
dicates that, typically, litigation costs will exceed ADR costs by
as much as 50%."' The Center for Public Resources has
claimed that ADR has been successfully used to resolve complex
disputes involving commercial contracts, patents, construction,
joint ventures and transnational issues,2 ' thereby demonstrating
its suitability for complex environmental disputes.
Alternative dispute resolution allows the judge, arbitrator, medi-
ator or negotiator to be creative in crafting a settlement."' This
would ensure the pursuit of a fair and just settlement, and alloca-
114. STRELOW, supra note 99, at 439.
115. Id. at 436.
116. CRONIN-HARRIS, supra note 99, at 1-33.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1-36 to 1-43 (citing DELOITE AND ToucHE LITIGATION SERVICES
1993 SURVEY OF GENERAL AND OUTSIDE COUNSELS: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, ed. 1993) and PRICE WA-
TERHOUSE 1993 LAW DEPARTMENT SPENDING SURVEY SCHEDULES 6.4 to 6.5
(9th ed.)).
119. CRONIN-HARRIS, supra note 99, at 1-36.
120. See James F. Henry, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Why a Corpo-
rate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation (1984).
121. Id.
531
532 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
tion of costs, as well as a realistic determination of the most ef-
fective ways in which to mitigate costs. Through the use of site-
specific cleanup goals and the direct supervision of the cleanup
contractor by the PRPs involved, contractors would not have the
opportunity to cheat the government and PRPs out of monies that
should have been spent on the actual cleanup itself.'22
This alternative settlement system would be funded through
already-existing Superfund taxes, as well as through private fund-
ing by the parties. The limited time frame provided under the
statute would require the parties to fund a much shorter period of
the equivalent for litigation costs and many of these costs would
be shared by the parties.'23 Therefore, a substantial savings in
litigation costs may be realized and the money saved could be
better spent on cleanup and redevelopment of sites.
In order to illustrate how the alternative system would operate,
imagine that company "A" has been identified by the EPA as a
PRP. Under this system, the EPA and the PRP would cooperate
in identifying other PRPs. If company "A" and the EPA discover
that companies "B," "C," and "D" are also PRPs, they would all
have the option of engaging in litigation or utilizing the alterna-
tive system. The savings achieved by avoiding protracted litiga-
tion operates to encourage these companies to choose to make
use of the alternative system. Additionally, if ADR is promptly
employed before extensive pre-trial discovery has begun, the
expenses that parties usually incur prior to trial can be greatly re-
duced.'24
Once the parties enter into the settlement system, an adminis-
trator would guide them through the various processes. The
choice of administrator is particularly important to the success of
the ADR system. Under this system, the administrator must be a
neutral third party with extensive knowledge of Superfund issues
and a reputation for integrity.'25 The administrator pool would
be drawn from the Center for Public Resources Judicial Panel and
122. See 141 CONG. REC. S3,068 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Glenn).
123. See discussion infra part I.
124. HENRY, supra note 121, at 1.
125. STRELOW, supra note 99, at 438.
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other eminent scientists and retired senior executives of major
corporations. 126 The PRPs would share in the costs of compen-
sation for the administrator and assistants the administrator deems
necessary,"' with costs to be divided according to the eventual
allocation of liability.
First, a short time period would be established, based on the
complexity of the particular case, during which the parties could
pursue factual investigation followed by negotiation and media-
tion. At the end of this period, if no agreement has been reached
and the administrator does not opt to extend the time period, the
parties may then seek either a summary trial before a judge or
binding arbitration. If the parties cannot agree on which option to
choose, the administrator of the case would make the decision
based on position papers presented by all parties. The time pe-
riods allotted to each process would be short enough to encourage
serious negotiation from the beginning, but long enough to allow
these negotiations to be meaningful and fruitful.
Returning to our hypothetical case, the EPA and "A," after
identifying the other PRPs, would invite "B," "C," and "D" to a
preliminary meeting with the administrator. The administrator
would explain the process and outline the advantages of ADR.
Under this proposal, parties would first be required to attempt to
resolve all the issues through ADR before having the option of
bringing a lawsuit. 2 Before beginning the negotiating process,
all of the PRPs would be encouraged to voluntarily agree to be
bound by the administrator's final determination in the event that
no settlement is reached. If, however, the PRPs are unwilling to
do so, the process will not necessarily fail.29 When the process
is complete, a rational PRP may realize, after reviewing the result
126. Id. Other neutral dispute resolution organizations that are available to
provide similar services include Clean Sites, American Arbitration Association,
Environmental Common Sense and Resolve. Crable, supra note 3, at 34.
127. STRELOW, supra note 99, at 438.
128. Kit R. Kricken & Pamela Rekar, Superfund Negotiators Suggest ADR As
Way to Break Settlement Logjam, in Alternative Dispute Resolution Practice and
Perspectives: A BNA Special Report 153, 158 (1990).
129. STRELOW, supra note 99, at 439.
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and the rationale supporting it, that he will not likely fare better
in court. 1
31
If negotiation and mediation fail to produce an agreement, the
administrator begins the next phase of the process. Each PRP has
an opportunity to be heard by the administrator in either an arbi-
tration or summary jury trial setting. After each party has present-
ed its argument, the administrator issues a final and, hopefully,
binding final determination. 3'
This alternative system is not the sole prong of this CERCLA
reauthorization proposal. It should be noted that the entire plan
presented here is a comprehensive approach and many of the
component parts will be facilitated and supported by other com-
ponents. The process described above is designed to save a sub-
stantial amount of present transaction costs and should relieve the
judicial system of the substantial burden created by lengthy envi-
ronmental cleanup litigation. Further, these funds could then be
put to better use in financing the cleanups themselves. A viable
ADR option may greatly enhance the efficiency of the pre-clean-
up process and reduce transaction costs, estimated to account for
thirty-eight percent of total CERCLA expenditures. 3 2
C. Local Control
In the words of former Governor of New Jersey and CERCLA
author Jim Florio, "[i]t doesn't make any sense to clean up a rail
yard in downtown Newark so it can be a drinking water reser-
voir.'' 33 Intuitively, if cleanup standards are lowered, less work
must be performed at each site, and cleanup costs will also de-
crease. 
34
The Republican congressional leadership of the 104th Congress
has considered handing over more of the supervision of cleanup
to state and local governments.'35 The Republicans have sug-
gested that the authority to determine how clean a particular site
130. Id. at 443.
131. Id. at 439.
132. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 369.
133. Schneider, supra note 53, at 30.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 167-69.
135. Cushman, supra note 6, at A19.
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needs to be delegated to the states. 136 In fact, congressional sup-
port for transferring nearly all authority to administer the
CERCLA program to the states is growing.'37 Under the
author's proposal, the federal and state governments should en-
courage companies to clean up and redevelop urban sites and
delegate supervision of cleanups to state and local governments.
As Stephen Goldsmith, Mayor of Indianapolis, Indiana, stated,
"[a]s citizens of my basketball-savvy state will tell you, the offi-
cial closest to the action is usually in the best position to make
the call."' 38 Control over the implementation of hazardous waste
site cleanup should be given to the states and local governments
who are the officials "closest to the action."
The statistics, not merely the rhetoric, support the contention
that the states should control CERCLA cleanups. In Illinois, Wis-
consin, and Minnesota more than 500 sites have already been
remediated under state supervision.'39 During the same time pe-
riod, the entire federal program has remediated only 280
sites."4 Forty-four states currently have CERCLA funding au-
thorities of their own.' 4' These states should be given the au-
thority to remediate the approximately 1300 NPL sites remain-
ing.142
In the original debates in the House of Representatives con-
cerning the enactment of CERCLA, Representative Dave Stock-
man (Republican-Michigan) suggested an alternative approach to
a centralized federal cleanup system.'43 He proposed that the tax
funds collected through CERCLA be given to the states in the
136. Id. Federal cleanup standards are contained in 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1994).
137. Viki Reath, Momentum Building to Shift Superfund to State Authority, 8
ENV'T WK. (Mar. 23, 1995), available in WESTLAW, ENVWK Database, 1995
WL 7721229.
138. Testimony to the House Ways and Means Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Jan. 12, 1995) (testimony of Stephen Goldsmith, Mayor of Indianapolis, Ind.),
available in WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY Database, 1995 WL 10397 [hereinaf-
ter Testimony].




143. 126 CONG. REC. HI 1,802 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1980) (statement of Rep.
Rudd).
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form of block grants.'" With this money the states would be
able to establish their own procedures to deal with hazardous
waste sites within their borders according to their own priorities
and standards.'45  Under this system, the only federal
involvement would be determining how much money each state
would receive." The author proposes that each state should re-
ceive a specified amount based on the number and size of the
CERCLA sites within their boundaries and should use those
funds, in addition to the funds they currently possess, for clean-
up-related expenses.
Currently, CERCLA cleanups administered by the federal gov-
ernment cost twenty-percent more than comparable private clean-
ups. 47 The unwieldy system that has been created makes it too
difficult for the EPA to properly supervise and reduce costs."
Local governments are in a better position to scrutinize the details
of a plan and devise cost-cutting efficienty measures. 49
Under state and local control it is more likely that there will be
more effective use of resources.5 It is very difficult for the
federal government to determine future land use of NPL sites on
a nationwide basis.' When control over cleanups is closer to
home, local prerogatives may be better achieved. 5
Support for decreased direct federal involvement in cleanups
has been forthcoming from many quarters. In testimony before
the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, May-
or Stephen Goldsmith stated a common feeling among many local
government officials:
[N]o federal agency gives less thought to the unintended side ef-




147. Viki Reath, Tax Question May Scuttle Radical Superfund Overhaul, 8
ENV'T WK. (Jan. 5, 1995), available in WESTLAW, ENVWK Database, 1995
WL 7721129.
148. Testimony, supra note 139 (testimony of Mayor Stephen Goldsmith).
149. Id.
150. Osborn & Williams, supra note 89, at 4.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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cy. When the EPA imposes draconian clean-up standards, it effec-
tively quarantines urban sites. No company will build and no bank
will lend on a property with even a hint of contamination, not for
fear of the environmental hazard, but for fear of EPA lawyers.
Rather than invest in clean-up, businesses and investment find it
much easier to leave our cities. Our tax base shrinks, the urban
sites never get cleaned up, and the urban poor lose access to good
jobs. Everyone loses. 53
It is difficult to create procedures that will work in all fifty
states. "'54 Local control of CERCLA cleanup standards will en-
able states and localities to determine how clean a site must be-
come in light of the site's probable future use.'55 Gearing clean-
up standards to potential future uses would allow funds to be
spent more efficiently."6 For example, Justice Stephen Breyer
recalled a case that came before him as Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 57 Although every-
one involved had conceded that a person could safely ingest dirt
at a certain Superfund site seventy days a year, the government
insisted on an additional expenditure of $9.3 million so that the
dirt would be safe for consumption 245 days per year.'58 The
government failed to take into account, however, that the site was
a swamp and nobody was going to consume the contaminated
dirt.159
Some states already have assumed an active role in stimulating
redevelopment of abandoned urban waste sites" known as
153. Testimony, supra note 139.
154. Osbom & Williams, supra note 89, at 4.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Alliance for Reasonable Regulation: Hearings Before the House of Repre-
sentatives Comm. on Gov't Aff., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 15, 1995) (statement
of Jerry J. Jasinowski, President of the National Association of Manufacturers),
available in WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY Database, 1995 WL 62917 [hereinaf-
ter Alliance] ; see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 12, 12-13 (1993).
158. Alliance, supra note 158 (statement of Jerry J. Jasinowski).
159. Id.
160. Gaines Gwathmey, III ,& William J. O'Brien, States Stimulate
'Brownfield' Development, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at S1, S9 n.6. (discussing
states that have enacted voluntary remediation programs that include aspects of
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'brownfields."'" Under the federal system, "[i]t is simply safer
to develop a cornfield on the periphery than to redevelop a down-
town site."'62 Some states, however, employ lower remedial
standards based on the assumption that future use of the site will
be non-residential.'63 Cleanup to meet such non-residential stan-
dards is less expensive because the standards governing the con-
tamination that may remain on-site are less stringent.' In
reauthorizing CERCLA, Congress should grant all cleanup super-
visory duties and powers to state or local agencies, who would
have the power to relieve future CERCLA liability for that site,
certify a developer's qualification for tax incentives and deter-
mine how clean a site must be in light of the expected future use
of that site. 65 In fact, many cities are currently lobbying for
projects designed to accomplish this objective."6
risk-based and future use-based remedial standards, including Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon and
Virginia). For example, New Jersey has made an effort to stimulate
brownfield redevelopment by employing less costly remedial standards based on
the assumption that the future use of a particular site will not be residential. Id. at
S9. Because there is less risk of exposure at a non-residential cleanup site, the
cleanup standards can be made lower and the cost of redevelopment can be re-
duced. Id. New Jersey's law also allows, in some circumstances, the construction
of fences and the posting of warning signs in lieu of cleanup. Id. This further
reduces costs. When less stringent cleanup occurs, restrictions on future use may
be placed on the site. Id.; see New Jersey Industrial Site Recovery Act ("ISRA"),
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 TO -13, 58:10B-1 TO -14 (WEST SUPP. 1995).
161. "Brownfields" are "industrial and commercial properties" that "are left
vacant and often abandoned, depriving cities of jobs and taxes, blighting the
cityscape, and discouraging urban redevelopment." Gwathmey & O'Brien, supra
note 161, at Si. These sites are "generally well-served by roads, rail, public
transportation and water and sewer systems." Id. They "generally suffer from at
least low levels of environmental contamination" and are "subject to the far-
reaching liability structure and rigorous remedial requirements of applicable fed-
eral and state environmental laws" such as CERCLA. Id.
162. 141 CONG. REC. R31 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995)(statement of Rep. Upton).
163. Gwathmey & O'Brien, supra note 161, at S9.
164. Id.
165. See John B. Casserly, Comment, Minnesota's Land Recycling Act: Solving
Problems by Evolving Superfund, 2 Wis. ENvTL. L.J. 261, 272 (1995).
166. Id. (citing Interview with Dave Gontarek, Project Manager, City of St.
Paul Planning Dept., St. Paul, Minn. (Nov. 22, 1994)).
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Lower costs and immunity from liability will encourage devel-
opers to utilize otherwise valueless urban sites. 167 Once the fear
of liability is eliminated, developers become interested in these
areas, that in many instances are equipped with pre-existing infra-
structure such as highway and rail access, public transportation
and water and sewer systems. 61 Instead of encouraging the
abandonment of these properties, this plan would stimulate rede-
velopment of brownfield sites and reduce the increasing number
of eyesores on the city landscapes.
Not only have those outside of the federal government recog-
nized the attraction of local control over Superfund sites. Con-
gressional leaders have taken note as well. Senator Robert C.
Smith (Republican-New Hampshire), Chairman of the Senate
Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Superfund,
Waste Control, and Risk Assessment, has recognized that state
and local agencies ought to have the authority to assess the risks
posed by hazardous waste sites and determine their own cleanup
priorities.
169
Under CERCLA, contractors have too little incentive to control
cleanup costs. 7° A recent study of three contractors revealed
that "all three billed the Government for entertainment, tickets for
sporting events, or alcoholic beverage costs."'' Audits of con-
tractors are rarely conducted due to the abundance of cases pre-
sented to the EPA for inspection and review.' Local control
allows closer monitoring of spending and may lead to a reduction
in costs.
167. See Gwathmey & O'Brien, supra note 161, at S9.
168. Id. at S1, S9.
169. Congressmen Say Everything is on the Table With Superfund, supra note
93, at 266.
170. 141 CONG. REc. S3,068 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1995)(statement of Sen.
Glenn).
171. Id.
172. As of August 1994, there were 528 outstanding requests submitted to the
EPA for audits. of Superfund contractor costs. Id.
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D. Tax Incentives
A last, but essential, component of this comprehensive plan for
CERCLA reform and reauthorization is the encouragement of in-
vestment and redevelopment of waste site locations through the
use of tax incentives. To further encourage brownfield redevelop-
ment, Delaware Governor Thomas Carper has endorsed a plan
under which the state grants tax credits and other reductions in
taxes to corporations that clean waste sites with the goal of rede-
veloping them.'
These ideas are not foreign to congressional leaders. Republi-
can congressional leaders have discussed the idea of offering tax
incentives to private companies that cleanup pollution voluntari-
ly.'74 In fact, the IRS has interpreted § 162 of the Interal Reve-
nue Code to allow a deduction for environmental cleanup-related
costs, providing private companies with the tax-based incentive to
clean up hazardous sites.175 Similarly, efforts to prevent pol-
lution and research to develop new non-polluting manufacturing
techniques may be encouraged through similar tax incentives176
173. Jerry Shields, Delaware: Governor Would Give Tax Credits for Pollution
Cleanup, 8 NAT. RESOURCES TAX REv. 1187 (1995). Other states that have en-
acted similar incentive plans include Minnesota and Wisconsin. Id. These plans
include an exemption from retroactive liability in order to allay developers fears
of potential liability. Casserly, supra note 169, at 263, 273. Although these plans
address state Superfund sites, which generally are less hazardous than Federal
Superfund sites, it is the author's proposal that similar tax incentives be offered
on a federal level.
174. Cushman, supra note 6, at A19.
175. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35; Rev. Rul. 80-245, 1980-2 C.B. 72.
The IRS recently revoked PaRv. LTR. RuL. 95-41-005, which denied a section
162 deduction for legal and consulting fees associated with environmental clean-
up. The IRS has ruled that these expenses are currently deductible as an ordinary
and necessary business expense. See Reversing Position, IRS Rules that Legal
and Consulting Fees Incurred in Anticipation of Environmental Cleanup Are Cur-
rently Deductible, 96 Tax Notes Today 13-3 (Jan. 19, 1996).
176. See, e.g., Hazel Bradford & Tom Ichniowski, Superfund Reform to Start
Afresh, 234 ENG'G NEwS-REC., Feb. 6, 1995, at 9.
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CONCLUSION
The Superfund program is currently funded by four corporate
level taxes. The rationale supporting this funding scheme is that
because corporations have benefited from the processes that creat-
ed hazardous waste, they should provide the means for cleaning
up contaminated sites. As proposals to reauthorize CERCLA con-
tinue to be introduced, one prevalent question has been whether
the current funding scheme should be continued.
CERCLA has been criticized for failing to achieve the goals of
providing for remediation of many of the contaminated sites
across the nation. This failure has been attributed to the high
transaction costs involved in apportioning liability between PRPs.
Another criticism has been the high cost of litigation between
PRPs and their insurers over coverage for brownfield cleanups.
The Clinton Administration has proposed two plans to
reauthorize CERCLA. The first simply extends the current
CERCLA tax scheme through the year 2000. The second, more
creative plan proposes the creation of the Environmental Insur-
ance Resolution Fund. The EIRF program was designed to lower
CERCLA transaction costs associated with litigation between
insurers and policy holders, as well as among PRPs. The EIRP
would be funded by three taxes on insurance policies intended to
raise $810 million. PRPs would be eligible to choose to be reim-
bursed from the fund for a specified percentage of their cleanup
costs, rather than litigate whether their insurer should cover the
claim. Opting for inclusion in the EIRF would preclude coverage
by the insurer, thus eliminating all liability associated with the
site for the insurer. To date, the EIRF proposal has failed to gain
congressional approval.
Congressional leaders are currently attempting to develop com-
prehensive reform of CERCLA. Their proposals include vesting
authority for remediation to state and local governments, autho-
rizing flexivle cleanup standards to be tied to expected future use
of the site, and the repeal of retroactive liability. By lowering
transaction costs, these proposals intend to achieve the goals of
CERCLA without imposing new taxes.
The author proposes a three-part reform of CERCLA. One
prong encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution to allo-
cate cleanup costs among PRPs. ADR is believed to be less cost-
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ly and less time-consuming than traditional litigation in deter-
mining these issues. As opposed to the EIRF proposal, which
merely shifts costs to the insurance industry, ADR is believed to
decrease the actual costs of the parties by reducing duplicate
costs and effort. ADR has been successful in lowering the costs
of resolving non-environmental disputes. Additionally, ADR
permits the decision-maker to reach more creative results to en-
sure fair and equitable settlements.
The second prong is to devolve authority over cleanups to state
and local governments. These authorities are believed to have the
ability to better control spending and to more effectively deter-
mine the appropriate cleanup standards based upoon expected
future use. State and local governments should receive block
grants from the federal government to allow them to implement
the cleanup processes that will be most effective within their bor-
ders. This devolution of control has been currently gaining in-
creasing support.
The final prong of the proposal is to use tax incentives de-
signed to encourage the development of new cleanup strategies,
as well as to encourage corporations to engage in cleanup activi-
ties. It is the author's view that no new taxes will be required to
implement this porposal. The compoenent parts of othis proposal
work together to encourage the successful and cost-effective
remediation of contaminated property.
